Locking Out the Undesirables

After the class discussion on whether or not people who committed crimes -- genocide, for example -- could be included in a discussion to reach a consensus on morality, and the general conclusion that they can't, it seems obvious that this implies a social contract in which members can only participate as long as they follows the rules. However, it appears that it would become increasingly difficult to determine whose opinions are acceptable. Is there really an objective standard of right and wrong (such as, as Lynch offers, a universal morality/"obligation to protect the innocent") that participants must adhere to?

Although that is a somewhat unpopular perspective, it's also pretty unpopular to actually listen to someone who argues against certain universal morals, i.e. argues for genocide. In that case, what are the terms of this universal morality? Does it only go as far as genocide, or are there other actions that are widely accepted to be crimes? Terrorism comes to mind, and I think that this is popularly considered wrong; it also appears that terrorists automatically lose their right to participate in a consensus on morality. It seems to be an issue of credibility; if you're trying to determine whether or not an action is moral, you don't consult someone you consider immoral.

However, if there were to be a discussion on morality, it would be interesting to see whom states were actually willing to invite; although we consider terrorism and genocide wrong, we do tend to prop up dictatorships and stand by while genocide occurs, which could be considered equally wrong by other states. Would we be considered too immoral to participate?

Jonathan Berman Searches for Consensus on the Morality of the State System

The interesting thing about Lynch's piece is how different it is from the other things we've read. The articles on liberalism, realism, and constructivism all try to be predictive and find the true causes of events in international relations. This is known as a positive approach and this approach goes along with the assumption that there are objective facts out in the world that we can know.

On the other hand, Lynch's piece takes a normative approach which is inherently prescriptive and uses norms and standards which stands in contrast to the positive approaches that we usually see in IR. This approach brings morality, principles, and values into international relations. Thus, when judging Lynch I believe we need to judge him on the principles he lays out, not on whether his system is feasible.

When reading his article the question we must ask is whether or not the system he lays out is a moral one. If Lynch's system is moral and right then we need to ask ourselves if international relations as it is practiced today conforms to this morality. After reading his article it is clear that it does not. Thus, if Lynch's values are moral and the international system as it is currently constructed does not match those morals then we are left to conlcude that the international system is inherently immoral.

However, I disagree with Lycnh's prescriptions. Namely, including everyone in the dialogue. Lynch's prescription taken to its natural conclusions means that in the case of Kosovo not only would the world have to be involved in the dialogue but the Serbs who were committing genocide would have to be included as well. I think that is wrong because by committing genocide in the first place I believe they have forfeited their right to be part of any consensus and treated as equals. The equivalent of letting Lynch's prescription coming to pass is allowing murderer's to sit in on the deliberations of a jury and giving them a vote. Clearly, this would be ridiculous.

Even though Lynch is wrong I think the notion that the international system could be immoral brings up some interesting issues. If international system conflicts with what we know to be moral can we still allow it to stand as is?

Critical theory vs. public goods liberalism

Lynch opens up his article by saying that "critical theory locates legitimacy within an emerging international public sphere of world citizens" (182). In other words, actions are legitimate when they benefit those citizens, and illegitimate when they don't. This seems fair enough, with the growing emphasis on human rights. However, he complicates things by saying that "legitimacy can only be achieved by reaching consensus through open public argument among all affected actors under conditions roughly free of considerations of power and self-interest" (183), and that's about where what I think Lynch would call my radical inner skeptic kicked in. When can states be considered free of self-interest? He attempts to answer this when defining communicative action, in which states decide to "set aside their self interest... and even their identities in order to seek truth -- or at least consensus about the right course of action" (183). Okay, so states must agree to momentarily set aside their own interests in order to make legitimate decisions based on (what appear to be) objective standards of right and wrong, where right choices benefit humans and bad choices, well, don't.

It makes sense, but I just can't believe that it would ever happen. Some of a state's self-interests are power, (usually?) international stability, national security, economic stability... etc., etc. According to Lynch, if a state is not free from these "considerations of power and self-interest" when it makes a decision to intervene in a conflict, this decision is not legitimate. However, all of these self-interests are of paramount importance to a state; how do you just set them all aside to make "legitimate" decisions? More to the point, how can you make a truly legitimate decision without considering every aspect?

Public goods liberalism, discussed in this earlier post, makes more sense. You might intervene in a situation for personal gain, as both Lynch and Boyer/Butler admits countries did in Kosovo, but you can still benefit others by intervening. PG liberalism doesn't hold countries up to the same unrealistic standard as critical theory; it admits that states are self-interested, and excuses that as perfectly normal. Critical theory seems to be telling states that if they're self-interested, they have impure motives and are incapable of doing good.

However, Lynch somewhat redeems himself later when stating that "critical theory can draw on constructivist international relations theory... by using the force of public exposure to bind states to their moral rhetoric, even if they employed it for nakedly strategic reasons" (191). This appears to be an acceptance of the manipulation he rejects earlier in the article, a tongue-in-cheek confirmation that, yes, states will sign on for personal reasons and use moral rhetoric to cover it up, but they can later be held accountable for that moral rhetoric, so there. Lynch is optimistic that a "critical, transformative practice" can be effective if states are forced to "live up to their strategically chosen rhetoric" (191), which strikes me as a suitable compromise. I do find it a little unlikely that states could be coerced into being moral to fulfill their promises, but it is possible. If a state forms an identity as a moral power, it would most likely be unwilling to do something that conflicts with that identity, and could ultimately become a moral power instead of simply having the reputation of being one.

Jonathan Berman Wanders Off Into Normative Space

I think the most fascinating thing I picked up from the readings was the concept of normative space. Although not real in any positive sense, normative space contains all of the beliefs, ideas, and norms that make up a given society's social world. Contained in normative space are all the standards of appropriate behavior, ideas, values, and beliefs produced by a society. However, normative space is not static, it is a highly contested space. Ideas and norms that conflict or differ from a society's current norms are constantly on the fringes of normative space and threaten to undermine those ideas that have ideational hegemony.

Looking back at the paragraph I just wrote normative space seems like a complicated concept, however, I believe it is quite simple. The consequence of normative space is that all new ideas and norms have to emerge in the context of current reigning ideas and norms that make up a society's social world.

But why is that important? Well, the answer is that those new ideas and norms that conform or play off themes of old norms and ideas will have the best chance of being picked up by the general public. Thus, themes like the US being "a shining city on a hill", values like freedom and liberty are universal, or the US is a haven against tyranny must be echoed by any politician who wants to get elected to higher office. Politicians must conform to these norms and make sure their policies fit with the values those norms promote or else they will be rejected by the electorate. Thus, fringe ideas like white superiority, marxism, militant animal rights, and militant environmentalism don't play well with the general public because they clash with society's current values.

That is why I believe that norm entrepreuners do their best when they put the new values they are promoting in terms of older values. These norm entrepreuners have the best shot at getting their ideas accepted because it reduces the amount of persuasion they need to do. Thus, for someone to convince Americans that something is right based on marxist values, they need to not only convince the public that the idea they have is right but also that marxist values are better than the ones they currently have. This a monumental task because it's almost taken for granted by society that marxist values are wrong. A norm entreprenuer can save themselves a tremendous effort by showing their new norms conform with old norms because it saves them the trouble of fighting additional, even more difficult, battles.