Limits of Anarchy

On Thursday, the class discussed anarchy and what conditions it required to exist. It was a hard definition to nail down, because anarchy has always meant "being able to do what you want without fear of punishment" to me. However, applying this to the international system made me think more seriously about anarchy, as did Matt and Nate's comments about whether anarchy could ever disappear as long as humans had free will.

I was interested in the idea that anarchy always exists, as long as we have the ability to do anything that conflicts with the established law. I would have argued (did argue, I think) that as long as there was the promise of retribution/punishment, this state still couldn't be defined as anarchy. But retribution does not have to necessarily come from the government -- it could come from the victim or the victim's family. In my opinion, what separates enforcement from vengeance is the way in which it is administered: by a government-controlled organization, impartially, as opposed to by people personally touched by crime. This is a little idealistic, though; police, as was pointed out, can't catch everyone, and many crimes go unreported, let alone unsolved. Realistically, your odds of committing crime and getting away with it are pretty good -- and in areas with poor enforcement, it could be said that anarchy exists.

Applied to the international system, this begs the question: even if a supranational organization with the power to enforce its laws could be formed, could it be expected to enforce them well? Justice requires impartiality, and (perhaps too cynically) I can't believe that the judges of international crime would be able to separate themselves from the biases of their own cultures enough to arbitrate it properly, and creating some kind of international jury system would be difficult if not impossible to do. Personally, I don't think it's possible for the international system to move beyond a state of anarchy; I'd like to continue this discussion in a later class to hear opinions on how it could be done.

Jonathan Berman Reflects on Anarchy in International Relations

In class we had an interesting discussion on anarchy. In past IR classes anarchy has always gotten a mention but I have never really discussed it. I think the ongoing debate in IR on whether structure (anarchy and the distribution of material capabilities) or process (interaction and learning) is an interesting one.

I never realized that some realists believe that anarchy is a permissive cause of state behavior in international relations. Anarchy allows war to occur but may not actually cause it, in fact in anarchy it may be just as likely to allow peace to happen. As a result, I think this highlights the important role that process can play. Interaction and learning which encompasses ongoing practices and common knowledge can play an important role in mitigating whether states decide to make war or peace.

I was kind of suprised by the neoclassical reading because, as I said in class, it seemed like a Pandora's Box that gave too many points to the liberal and constructivist branches of international relations. By looking at a leader's perceptions and beliefs you are looking at things that are directly impacted by process. How those leaders interpret the actions of other states can directly affect what foreign policies they enact. If they interpret state actions as peaceful they will be likely to embark on a peaceful foreign policy (unless they are a revisionist state). In addition, should they interpret actions as hostile, they will embark on hostile policies to counteract them. Thus, this highlights the importance of looking at how a state's actions are ascribed meaning by other states and use that to tell us the nature of the international system.

LINKS ADDED

NOTE: Before I begin let me take the time to let everyone know that I have added links to the other group's blogs. This should facilitate communication between our disparate groups and hopefully unite our ramblings into one cohesive whole. I hope the other groups add links to their blogs too. The instructions to add links to a blog are here:

http://help.blogger.com/bin/answer.py?answer=110

Neoclassical realism

Neoclassical realism, according to Sterling-Folker, argues that relative power distribution and perceptions of this relative power profoundly impact, if not define, foreign policy. She applies neoclassical realism to the situation in Kosovo during the Clinton Administration, and also (briefly) to the Iraq war.

Neoclassical realism appears to me to be the most realistic (no pun intended) theory of foreign policy that we have studied so far. (I am in the process of taking World Politics now, and thus haven't heard of, well, any of these theories until this semester.) It strikes me as particularly realistic because it incorporates the human reaction to perceived power, rather than dealing with absolute power only. What a policymaker thinks about a situation has more influence on policy than what is actually going on, since his opinion will delineate his policies regardless of whether or not his opinion is valid. By arguing that policy is ultimately dependent on elite perceptions, neoclassical realism allows for the fact that these perceptions may be wrong.

For example, as Sterling-Folker points out, "fear of potential relative power loss and challenges to US prestige appeared to drive the administration's strategy" in Iraq (51); whether the actual impact on perceived US power would have been great enough to merit our investment in this war is debatable, but policymakers made the value judgment and involvement was necessary to prevent the US from being perceived as weak.

Although I believe that more factors are involved with such a tremendous decision as going to war, neoclassical realism appears to provide a solid base for examining foreign policy decisions. Power perceptions are vital to security -- after all, countries are less likely to attack a nation that appears more powerful than themselves.

Jonathan Berman Appraises Neoclassical Realism

Taliaferro, in MAKING SENSE OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS THEORY, defines neoclassical realism as a theory that identifies the relative distribution of material power as the main influence of a nation's foriegn policy (38). Yet, what differentiates neoclassical realism from other realisms is that the neoclassical theory believes a leader's perceptions and beliefs about the distribution of power and prestige drive their decisions (38). According to Taliaferro, great powers intervene in inconsequential areas of the world and take risks in order to protect their state's perceived prestige and power. Often times these adventures fail yet leaders still go forward with their plans (51).

I am hesitant to discuss the example of Yugoslavia because my familiarity with the region and with Operation Allied Force are sparse. However, what I do know about is Thucydides and the Athenian invasion of Sicily. It's interesting that neoclassical realism and the theme of the History of the Peloponnesian War is so similar. If one takes the Melian Dialogue and the campaign against Syracuse together we get the stong do what they can, they are prone to misjudge their relative capabilities, take on too much, and suffer catastrophe as a result.

Sound similar to Taliaferro? Clearly, Thucydides has had some influence.

The death of Pericles left the Athenians without a voice of reason. The Athenians were overcome with confidence that they could crush the Sicilians themselves and launched a campaign that would force them to use the majority of their forces in a far away land. Of course, they never expected that Sicily was actually quite large and well populated, and that the Sicilain navy would beat them. The campaign was a disaster and Athens was conquered soon after. The History of the Peloponnesian War stands as a counter argument to anyone who says any war will be easy and if more people took the lesson to heart we wouldn't get in trouble as often as we do.

Perhaps, it is human nature though. Yet, I am not so sure. Neoclassical realism I think is a step back from Waltz's MAN, THE STATE, AND WAR which decries first image (individual level) and second image (state level) analysis for third image (the international system) analysis. That is probably a good thing because, as the adage goes, "all politics is local."

It seems to me that as realism develops more and more it seems to get closer and closer to constructivism and liberalism. Analyzing a leader's perceptions and beliefs seems to emphasize process over structure. Wendt discusses in ANARCHY IS WHAT STATES MAKE OF IT the fact that social theory tells us "that people act towards objects and other actors, on the basis of the meanings that the objects have for them" (Wendt 396-7). Thus, US military dominance has different significances for the Netherlands and Iran. As a result, the Netherlands and Iran have very different policies in regards to the US.

This is a good thing because if anarchy and the distribution of capabilities were the sole source of conflict in the world then the human species would be doomed to an eternity of wars and violence because for the forseeable future there will always be strong and weak states. However, if as constructivists and liberals posit, process, namely interaction and learning, drive the international system, the possibility exists that we can "educate" ourselves to make peace. It all depends on whether we can teach ourselves to see the international system as a collective security system instead of a self-help system.